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In this paper we characterize the anbgamc períect Nash equilibria of a
location-tben-price game where firma first chooae locations and after that
compete {or pricea in two aubsequent perioda. Locationa are thue aeen as
long term commitments. There are two types of conaumera, each with
poasibly different valuations for the varianta offered by the firme. Uue
to changes in the fractions of the consumer types, competition in both
periods may di(fer. Firma anticipate that their location choice influencea
price competition in both periods and ChereÍore maximize their two pe-
riod profit. We prove the existence oí a unique aubgame perfect Naeh
equilibrium and give explicit expresaiona (or the location choices íor eome
specific cases.
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1 Introduction
In thc IiLcral.urc the IocaLion decision of firrnx is aasumed to be a atrategic one,
in othrr words, iL ix aaaumed that firms Lake into account the e.ffect oC their
location decision on the price Lhey can set.
In case of multiple perioda, if price competition is the same in every petiod,
it is sufficient to study the standard two atage IocaLion-then-price game due to
Hotelling (1929). This is the procedure usually followed in the literature. [f
however price competition differs over perioda, for example due to changea from
the demand side over time, the outcome of the standard model, with only one
period of price competitíon, is not appropriate.
In this paper we look at the situation where location ia a two period commit-
ment for each firm and so there aze Lwo periods of price competition. Uaually
firms are concerned about their (near) future and try to incorporate future
changes into Lheir decision (aee for example Harrison (1987)). We adopt the
view Lhat firms t.ake into account the impact oC their decieion on their pet pe-
riod profits. A two period location commitment would be the case if the coste
o( relocation are relatively high or a contract is signed by the firm to be located
on thc sarne spot for two periods. Friedman and Thisae (1993) look at n period
location comrnitments, but they assume that tïrma will aelect their locations,
knowing LhaL a particular trigger príce equilibrium will enaue.
In order Lo modcl the difterencew in price competition between Lhe two pe-
riods, we consider an econorny with Lwo Lypex o( conaumers, having posaibly
valuaLion differcnccs for Lhe products offereJ by the firme. The fractiona of con-
aumcr types may di(fer over Lime. 'Che model ia motivated by the overlapping
generations lilerature, LhaL promotcs the idea that conaumera' valuatione di4
fer by age (see for example Samuelson (1958), Diamond (1965), or Weddepohl
(1990)).
Each consumer buys one of the mutually exclusive variants. Consumers
Lake a decision per period and buy from the cheapes( source, i.e., the firm with
Lhe lowest overall price. As in Anderson, de Palma and Thisae (1992) we uae
an indirect utiliLy function that involves both transportation costs and quality
difference aspects. The valuations consumera have for the products of the firma
can be seen as prices to compensate for (aubjective) quality differencea.
We will derive that there exiats a unique equilibrium for the location-then-
price game with two periods of price competition. Furthermore we give a com-
plete characterization of this equilibriurn. The equilibrium outcome of course
depends on the consumers' valuations and the fractions of conaumer types over
time. We show in which direction firms' locations aze forced compared to the
situation with one period of price competition.
'I'he contribution of our model to location theory is twofold. F'irat the long
term (strategic) effects of location choices aze taken into account and aecond
a frarnework is provided to study an economy where different conaumer typea
coexist.2
'Che paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we prescnt the standard
location-then-price game in which consumers have valuation differences. We
discuss Lhis one period model quite extensively because it is needed to under-
stand the rest oC the paper. In Section 3 we formulate a location-then-price
game with valuation difterences, but now there aze two periods of price compe-
tition. In Section 4 we calculate the unique subgame períect Nash equilibrium
for this game. In Section 5 we give an example and in Section 6 we draw some
conclusions.
2 The basic model
'There is a continuum of consumers distributed uniformly with denaity one along
the line segment [0, 1]. A fraction oY of them is young and a fraction ao -
1- aY ot them is old, henceforth referred to as the young (Y) and the old (O).
Both types of consumers are located uniformly along the line aegment. The
young and Lhe old difter with reapect to their valuations of the quality of a
cerlain produrt o(fered by each of two firms.
Let ae denote the valuation conaumers of type B E 6- {Y,O} have for firm
i's product, i E{1,2}. Each consurner of type 0 has rea: income wB and buys
one unít of a single variant.
Firm i locates at x; and sells variant i at (real) price p;. Firms are assumed
to rnaximize pro(its in a two stage location-then-price game. We assume that
firm 'l locates to the right of firm 1.
Assumption 1 Frrm 2 locates to lhe righf ojfir7n 1, i.e., zl G xz.
For a discussion of the impact of this assumption see Bester, de Palma,
Leininger, von '1'hadden and Thomas (1991). Note that firms' locationa may
well he outsidr the intcrval [0, 1]. The, degree of differentiation can bc higher then
;i.v compared Lo Lhe rnaxirnum di(ferentiation result oC d'Aspremont, Cabszewicz
and 'Chisse (1979). Sornetimes this is called excessive differentiation (see Tirole
(1988, p.28fi) and Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992, p.299)). Excessive
di(fcrentiation can be mitigated when demand is distributed more closely to the
centre (see Webers (199A), for example).
F,ach type. B consumer buys one uoit of the variant that offers the greatest
conditional indircct utility, for firm i given by the additive form
VB(x) - we - p; f aa - t(x, x;), for i E{1,2}, (2.1)
whcrc x is thc consumcr's location in thc charactcristics space and l(x, x;) is thc
transportation casL Cor shipping cornmodity i Lo Lhe conaumer's location. We
assume this transportation cost to be quadratic, i.e., the square of the distancc
between the consumer's location and the firm's location. Note that t(x,x;) is
individual specific and that ws and aB are group specífic.i
"I'here are two different market apaces. The market apace of variant i among
consumers o( type a E 6 is defined as
MB -{x E[0, 1] ~ V;B(x) 1 ViB(x), J~ r}, (2.2)
that is the set of type B consumers that prefer variant i over variant j.
The demand X; for commodity i is the sum of the demanda for variant i by
bolh Lypes of consumers, i.e.,
X; -~ J nBdx, for i E{1,2}. (2.3)
BEe Mr
f3y definition Lhe sum of commodity demanda, Xr t Xz, equals 1.
We furthrrrnore assume that the firms cannot influence the valuation con-
snmers have for any of Lhe commodities. The location oC Lhe type B consumer
indifirrcnt bctwcen buying frorn firm 1 and buying from firm 2 is denoted by iB
and is givcn hy
B B
iB - x; t xi } Pi - Pt } a~ - a~ (2.4)
2 2(xi - x~) 2(xi - x~)
being the midpoint between the firrns'locations corrected for price differencea
and consumers' valuation differences. We furthermore see that in general iY ~
io Under Lhe assumption that the consumera' valuation differences are not too
large, both Grrns however will sell their products to both the young and the old.
From equation (2.3) it then follows
Xr -~ oBiB, Xz - 1- Xr, (2.5)
BE9
which rneans that firm 1's market ahare is a weighted sum of the location of the
indifferent cousurner oC both types. The weights aze the respective fractiona in
thc population.
Given Lhr locations and prices firrn i's profit is equal to
fl;(xi,xi,P„Pi) - P;X„ (2.6)
whcrc X; is givcn by (2.5). Coets are normalizcd to zcro.
We analyze a subgame perfecL Nash equilibriurn in which firrns first chooae
locations and then choose prices. Given locationa xr and xz in the firet stage,
Lhe corresponding price subgame is solved by prices pi(xr,xq) and p2(xr,xz)
such that
II~~x.,xi,Pi(xr,xz),P~(xr,xz)) ~ 11~(x;,xi,P„P~(xr,xa))
for all p; E[D,oo) and i E{1,2}.
Profits, evaluated at the second-stage equilibrium (p~ (xr, xz), p'z(xl, xz)), are
denoted by [l;(x;, zi ) - 11;(x;, xi, p;(xl, xz), P~(xr,xz)).'I'he equilibrium of the location game is given then by the pair (xi, x2), satisfying
Assumption ] and satisfying
II;(x~,x~) 1 fl;(x;,z~) Cor all x; E(-oo,oo) and i E{1,2}.
A subgarnc perfect Nash equilibriurn for the location-then-price game is de-
(ined by (zi,xi) and by (pi(zr,xz),pi(xt,xz)) Cor all location pairs (xl,xz).
The corresponding equilibrium outcome is (xi,xz) and (pi,pz) where pj -
Pi(xi,xi) and Pi - Pi(xi~x2).
Theorem 2.1 Define Ao - ~aEe aa(aB - az). The unique suógame perfeci
Na.rh equihbrrnm for the location-fhen-pnre game is the (ocation parr (xi, xi) -
(-q } 3, n t 3) and, for any (xl,xz), the pnce pair (Pi(xt~xz),P2(xt~xa))
(á((xz - xt)(xt t xz t 2) t Aa)~3((xz - xt)(4 - xt - xz) - Ao))-
Proof First wc look at the price stage. Let xr and xz be given. Maximizing
equation (2.6) with respect to p; gives p;(xt,xz,p~) - 2(x~ - x;)X;. For í- 1
this mcans pr(xt,xz,pz) -'(pz f.ffo -F (xz - xt)(xz -~ xr)) and for i- 2
this mcans Pz(xr~xz~Pr) - á(Pr - Ao f(xz - xt)(2 - xr - zz)). But then
Pi(xt~xz)- 3((xz-xt)(2-i-xtfxz)d-Ao)andPi(xi~xz)-á((xz-xt)(4-
xt - xz) -.Ao). Next we look at t.he location atage. Given pi(xi,xz) ar.d
pi(xr,xz) firrn i rnaximizes II;(zt,xz) with respect to x;. ít is easy to verify
that Ili(xi,xz) - rs ~:-~ {(xz - xr)(2 t xt -1- xz) f Ao}z and llz(xr~xz) -
tntr,-:,~{(r.z - xi)(4 - xt - xz) - AoJz. Frorn Lhese expressions it follows
that xi and xz rnust satisfy the cquations (xz - xl)(2 t 3xt - xz) - Ao and
(xz - xr)(-4 - xr -1. 3xz) - Au. This gives the snlution xi --q f 3 and
xi - 4 t~. One can verify that the second order conditions are satisfied.
It is easy to see that the equilibrium outcome is (xi ~ xi) -(-á f á~ á t s)
and z.') -(1 ~ z~y, ~- z~p) with profits (IIi,IIi) -(~(Z f z~)z3(Z - (Pi,7e
2~)2)
If Ao - t) t.hr. consumers have 'on average' the same preference for both
products. lu this case the eyuilibrium outcome is (xi,xi) - (-~,4) and
(pi,pi) - ( z, 2) Profits are 4 per firrn. I( Ao ~ 0 consumers on average
have a stronger preference for the product of firm 1, which enables firm 1 to set
a higher price and to locate closer to the centre. Firm 2 has to set a lower price
and movcs from the centre in order to soften price competition. Consequently
firrn 1's profit increases and firm 2's profit decreases. The situation .4o C 0 is
similar.
Note that eyuilibrium prices are non-negative for Ao E[- 4, q]. Fltrthermore
firms' profits dif(cr for Au ~ 0. This does not necessarily mean that in order to
guarantec firrns e.qual profits consumers' valuations should be equal over firms,
but Lhat a highcr valuation by one type of consumers is compensated through
a lowr,r valuation by the other type of consumers.Recall that consumer valuations for the products aze given exogenously. We
thus abstract írom the Cact that firms have an incentive to influence Ao through
thc ronsumer valuations for Lhcir product.
3 Changing fractions of consumer types over
time
In the previous section we have looked at the situation where firms choose lo-
cations and prices in a two-stage game. Firms thereby take the fraction of
consumer types and the consumer valuations into account. Now we want to ex-
tend the model to one where also changes over time in the fractions oCconaumer
types are taken into account. Once firms have settled, they serve the mazket
Crom this location in the aubsequent periods. We assume that there are two
periods, t and t t l, in which firms set prices. Before Lhe start of period t firms
choose locations. Firrn i E{1,'l} locates at x; and sells commodity i at price
p;, in pcrind r E T -{t,l f 1].
Again there is a continuum oC consumers distributed uniformly with density
onc along thc line segment [D, 1]. In period r E 7 a fraction aY of them is
young and a Craction ao - 1- ar of them is old. The valuation consumers of
type 0 E O have for firm i's product is assumed to be constant over time and
is givcn by ae as be(ore. Real income for consumers of type B E 9 is constant
ovrr typc and is given by wB.
In period r each type 0 consumer at location x buys one unit of the variant
Lhat. o(Ccrs thc grcatcst. conditional indircct utility, for firm i given by
V,B (x) - wB - p;, } aa - t(x, x;), for i E{ l,'l}, (3.7)
whc~rc the interpretation of the tcrms is the same as before. Note that only
prices arc Lirne dependent. The market space o( vaziant i arnong conaumers of
typc 0 E(-) in pcriod r E 7 is defincd as
MB -{x E [0, 1] ~ VB (x) 1 V~ (x), j~ i}, (3.8)
i.c., the sct of type 0 consumers at time r that prefer variant i over variant j.
'1'hc demand X;, Cor commodity i in period r is the aum of the demanda in
period r Cor variant i by both types of consumers, i.e.,
X;, -~ J
rradx, for i E{1,2}. (3.9)
BE6
Ms
At time r the location of the type 0 consurner indiflerent between buying
from firm 1 and buying from firm 2 is denoted by ie and is given by
xB - x; f xi } pi, - P;,
t ae - ar ( ) 3.10
2 2(xi - xr) 2(xi - x~)6
Similarly Lo (2.5) it then [ollows
X„ -~ aBia, Xz, - 1- Xt,. (3.11)
BE9
Firm i's 'lifetime' profit equals
n:~(x:~xi~Rr~PinP:att,Pirtt)-~P'-rP:,X:,~ (3.12)
rET
whcre X„ is given by (3.11) and p is the time diacount factor. For eimplicity
we takc p- 1. 1~irrn i's lifetime profit is the (discounted) aum of the per period
pro(its.
Firm i's profit in period r is equal to
n:,(x:, xi ~ P;„Pi,) - P;,X:,. (3.13)
1'he price choice in period t does not affect the price choice in period t t 1.
Therefore we can consider the price choices in both periods seperately. The
price game in period r is solved by prices pi,(xr,xz) and p2r(xr,xz) such that
f1:,(x:,xi~Pi,(xr,xz),P„(xr,xz)) ~ n:,(x:~xi,P:,,P~,(xr,xz))
for all p;, E[O,oo) and i E {1,2}. For ease of notation let II;L(z;,xi) -
~:i,(x:~xi,Pir(xt~xz)~P~r(xt~xz),Pitfi(xr~xz),Pirtt(xr~xz))
Thc equilibrium of the location game is Lhen given by (x~,x2) eatiafying
II;~(x„xj) ~ D;~(x;,x~) tor all x; E (-oo,oo) and i E{1,'l}.
A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the location-then-price game ia de-
fined bY (xi~xs) and bY {(Pit(xr~xz),Psr(xt,xz)),(Pietr(xr,xz)~Pietr(xr,xz))}
for all location pairs (x~,xz). The corresponding equilibrium path is (zi,xy)
and {(Pír(xi~xz)~P2c(xi,xz))~(Pirtt(xi~xi),Pzetr(xi,xz))}.
Lr.mma 3.1 For r E 7 define A, -~BEB oa(aB -ai). At locations xr and xz
the price game at hme r E 7 is sotved 6y prtices pi,(xr,xz) - 3((xz - xr)(2 }
xt t xz) f A,) and Pz,(xt~xz) - á((xz - xr)(4 - xt - xz) - A,).
Proof As noted before the price choice in period t dces not affect the ptice
choice in period t f 1. Therefore the solution of each price etage is found by
Theorem 2.1.
As we saw already in Section 2 the firm aelling the product for whicó the
consumers on average have a stronger prefetence, is able to aet a higher price
while the other ftrm can only charge a lower price.
To dcterrnine a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the location-then-price
game we also have to solve the location stage. This is done in the next section.4 Subgame perfect Nash equilibria
In Lhis scction wc show that them existx a uniquc subgame perfecL Nash e,qui-
libriurn for I,hr modcl with changing fractions of ronsurncr typrz~. 4'urtherrnorc
we give a complete equilibrium characterization. '1'his ehows in which direction
and to what extent firms adjust Lheir locations in case price competition differe
ovcr thc two pcriods.
Given the equilibrium price schemes (p~;(xl,xz),pát(xr,xz)) and (pirfl(xr,xz),
p2t} ~(xi , xz)) it is easy to check that X;, -~~. Firm i wanta to maximize
its profit rry ~~-~ ~,ET(3pir(xl,xz))z ~vith respect to x;.
L,et C- x~ t xz and define A - Ar f Arfr and 0- Ai -~ A~tr. Given the
equilibrium price schemes, the first order conditions for the location game are
2(xz - x~)z{(2 f 4xr - C)(C f 2) - A} - ~
2(xz - xl )z{(4 - 4xz } C)(4 - C) -F A} - 0
(4.14)
and the second order conditions for a maximum aze
-2(4 t 3xr f xz) t s~~js C 0
(4.15)
-2(8 - xr - 3xz) { ~~~~r G 0.
'fbr systoni of rquations (4.14) is solvrd by x.~(C) and xz(C) satisfying
4(C-1)x.r(C)-2C1-8Ct6fA
(4.18)
4(C - 1)xz(C) - 2Cz f 4C - 6- A.
For (xr(C),x2(C)) to be an e,quilibrium of the location game, C must solve
2(xZ(c) - x,(c))2{(2 f axr(c) - c)(c f 2) - A} - o- o. (4.1~)
For C~ 1 this can be rewritten as
3s(c - l- ~)~ {(c - 1)(c - 4)(c f z) t 3A} - 2o(c - 1)' - o. (4.1s)
The lefthand side of equation (4.18) is a polonomial of degree five and is denoted
by F~(C). After some tedious calculations we get F,~(C) - 36C5 -(180 t
12A)C4 t(Az f 48A t 36 - 20)C3 -} (612 f 144A - 3Az t 6~)Cz -(42Az t
384Af792ffi~1)Cf(3A3f44Azf204Af288f20) - 0. Note that 0 G Az G 20
and moreover Á1 - 20 Cor Ar - A;~r.
In order to guazantee that both firms are in the market we assume that the
degree of vertical difterentiation is limited, i.e., the value of A, for r E 7 is not
too big.
Assumption 2 F'or r E T, A; C 3.8
Without loss of generality we resLrict ourselves to the aituation A 7 0. This
mcans Lhat for thc two-pcriod situaLion consumera 'on average' preCer firm 1's
product to firrn 'l's producL. The meaning of 'on average' is alightly different
Lhen before. IL is still possible that firm 2's product is preferred ín one period,
hul. Lhis ia offsct by a stronger preference for firm 1'a product in Lhe other period.
Proposition 4.1 I,et Ar and Ar~i 6e grven. AIt five roots oJ lhe equation
F',c(C) - 0 nre real. These roots are in the intervaf (-oo, 1-} ~], [lt r~, lf 1z],
[1 -F 12, 1 t'~i ], [1 -} ~, 1 t iZ], and [1 f 1z , oo), respectively.
Proof First notc that lirr~-.-~F,t(C) -- oo and lim~r„Fa(C) - oo. Sub-
sLitution in equation (9.18) yielda F,c(1 ~ 1z) -(A{12)3(AZ{4 } 972 - 20),
Fa(1 t ~Z)--20(A{6)~, Fa(1 } 3z)-(A{12)3(27A~{4 f 324 - 540), and
Fa(1 f 11)-(A{3)s(AZ-20). Because both A~ and Aitl are smaller than 3,
wchavcFa(If~)?O,F',i(1-~ 12)GO,F,~(1} ~z)10,andFa(]t ~j)C0.
13ecausc l~'A :(-oo, oo) ~ 2 is continuous Lhe intermediate value theorem says
Lhat Cor each oC Lhc intcrvals there cxists a tG in it such that F,c(rj,) - 0.
'['he bounds Cor the first and thc last interval can be narrowed easily. It is
Ieft. Lo Lhc rcader lo chetk that the first rooL is in the intcrval [-3,-2] and the
fifth root is in Lhc interval [3,4].
Ilecause the cquation Fa(C) - 0 has five real roots it is possible to construct
two pairs of syrnmeLric roots. We denote these roots as Cr - L- c, Cz - L t c,
Ci - M- ó, C~ - M-}. ó. The remaining root equals C5 - 5 f 3- 2M - 2L
Lhen. Next. we define Ca(C) - 36(C - Ci)(C - C2)(C - C3)(C - C4)(C - Cs).
Rewriting yiclds C,t(C) - 36{Cs-(5fA{3)C4-}73C3-FyaCa-~ryrCt7o}, with
70 -(L2MZ -! 2ó2 -M2c2 fczó~)(-5-A{3i-2M t2L), 7r -(2Ló~ f 2Mc2 -
2I.MZ - 2M l.Z)(-5 - A{3 t 2M f 2L) t (LZM2 - L~óZ - M~e~ t c~6~), y2 -
(M2 } 4MI,t I,1-c~-bz)(-5-A{3f2Mf2L)-F(2LóZt2Mcz-2LM~-2ML~),
and y;j -(-2M - 27,)(-5 - A{3 f 2M t 2L) q- (M~ -~ 4ML f !,Z - c2 - 6~).
Cornparing l~~(C) and Ga(C) gives the following.
Lemma 4.2 !-ór any C, Ca(C) - Fa(C) for L, M, e and ó satisJying
(i) 7a-AZf48At36-20
(ii) y2 - 612 i- 144A - 3AZ -F 60
(iii) 71 - -4'lAZ - 384A - 792 - 6~
(iv) 70 - 3A' t 44AZ f 204A f 288 t`20.
NoLe thaL the existence oC an !„ M, c and 6 satisfying conditiona (i) to (iv)
rs guaranteed lor any A and 0 becauae Lhe equation F',c(C) - 0 ha.g five real
roots.
It is not possiblc however to give explicit analytical expressiona Cor M, L, e
and ó in the general case, and therefore we have to compute these numbets
nurnerically.9
For the spccial situations A~ - Arti and ,4r --Ar~t we give analytical ex-
pressions in the. following two corollaries. We omit the proof of theae corollariea
because they can be sr.en as a direct consequence of Lemma 4.2.
Corollary 4.3 Sappose Ar - Ar~~. TAen L--z, M- 7 , cz -~~ z, and
bz - á- 2 solve (i) to ({vJ. Furthermore Ct G C2 G Cy G Cs G C4.
For the special situation A~ - Artr - 0 we only have three different roota.
1'his result also holds for the more general case Ar --Artr.
Corollary 4.4 Suppose Ar --Arfr. Then L- 1- z(9 t ~J18)~, M-
1 t 2(9 f 4~18)~, and ez - bz - ;- F 72 solve (i) !o (iv). FurlAer~rtone Cl G
Cy CL,3 CCS GCi4.
Given the vahies Ck, k E{1,...,5}, of C that solve (4.17), xi(Ck) and
zz(Ck) can be determined írom equation (4.16) for all k. We diatinguiah for
k E{ 1, ..., 5} between the situations Ck - 1 and Ck ~ 1 for some k.
For Ct - 1 cquation (4.16) requires that A - 0, so Ar --Ar~i. Denote
p-:- 3A~. '1'hcn equation (4.17) can bc rewritten as
xI{Ck)'-;lxl(~'k)2f ~-0. (4.19)
After substituting x~(Ck) - y f q wc havc
3 a 2~-1
y - lfiyt 32 -0. (4.20)
Assumption 2 implies p(p - 1) G 0, so the roots for equation (4.20) are
y~ - tcos(á), yz - zcos(~ i 120), y3 - jcoa(y f 290), (4.21)
whem m-arctan(2 ~~ZN~ ) for p~ 2 on the condition that ~ E [90, 180]
and ~-arccos(1 - 2p) for p G ~ on the condition that ~ E [0,90]~. For
A, - A,ti - 0 we have y~ - y3 - ~ and yz --2. For more details about the
derivations wc refcr the reader to Uspensky (1948).
'I'hcrc is only an equilibríum when p(p - 1) G 0, i.e., 0 G A~ C 3. [ntuitively
this is what we expected. If thc consurners' preference for one of the firma is
vcry large, therr. cannoL be an equilibriurn where both firma are in the market.
~ Without Assumption 2 thc xituation r.(~~ - 1) ~ 0 cm occur. 'Phrn the rcel root m
y~ - {'-~" t ~(p(v- ~))3}3 f { r-2p - ~(v(v- ~))~}i.
64 32 64 32
Hut then z~ (C) ~ 3~4 and xa(C) G 114, whid~ contredicte Aesumption 1. For the aituMion
C- 1 we thus essentielly do nol need Assumptinn 2.10
Note that this is equivalent to the condition in Aeaumption 2. With the
above resulLs we can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 4.5 When Ck - 1 lhen is a unique aotution to the location stage.
Firm 1 chooses location ~ t 3cos(3 t 120) and firyn E eAooses foeation ,a-r -
tcos(~ ~ 120) where ~ as specified óefore.
Proof For all 0 C p G 1 it holds according to (4.21) that yz C y3 G yl.
For 0 G t~ G t we have yz E[- z,~íl, - 2], y3 E[- Z, 0], and yr E[0, z]- For
1 G tr G 1 we have yz E[-2.~~1,0],y3 E[O,z], and yr E[?,2JS]. Then
rz(C) - x~((') - g- 2y is rninimal for yz and prices are maxirnal. Hecause
Xr - Xz - 2 in all three situations, profits for both firms are rnaximized for
y- yz. One can check that the second order conditions for a maximum for both
firms are indced satisfied for y- yz.
Next we consider the situation Ck ~ 1. Equation (4.16) can be rewritten
then as
z c-r c-3 f,4
tl(C) - 4 C-1 x2(G,) - Z C-4 C 13 -A . (4. 22)
From the second order conditions in the location atage we will derive that
the equilibrium locations aze Cound for C in the interval [I f 1z , 1 f u].
I,emma 4.6 When Ck G 1f ly and Ck 7 1 f 12 there does not exist a location
equiliórium.
Proof It is clear that there only exists a location equilibrium it the second
order conditions for both firms aze satiafied. We will prove that for Ck G
1.} 1z and Ck ~ 1 f ~Z the second order conditions are not satiafied Cor both
firrzrs. From (4.15) we see that the second order conditions for a maximum
arc `l(z~ (C) - xz(C))3(4 i- 3xt(C:) -f xz(C)) f 0 G 0 Cor firm 1 and 2(xr (C) -
xz(C))3(S - x~(C) - 3xz(C)) f 0 G 0 for firm 2. With the help of equation
(4.22) we can rewrite these conditions as Sl(C) G 0 and Sz(C~ G 0 where
Sr(C) - 2( z c r) - 3)3(1 t 2C i- z cr) f ~ and Sz(C) - 2( z C-r - 3)3(5 -
2C-}. z ~r)f~. First note that Sr(C) ~ 0 for C G-z because both z ~1-3
and 1 f 2C f z ~ r are negative then. Furthermore for C~ 3, Sz(C) ~ 0,
because both zl~ r - 3 G 0 and 5- 2C ~- z~ r G 0. It is easy to see that
L' - 4~- s~nA solves 5- 2C f z cr - 0. For C 7 4 f a44~ it holds
that 5- 2C i- z ~ r G 0. From Asaumption I we furthermore know that
4} 944~ G 3. Dut Lhis is what we wanted to prove.
Now we can formulate the Collowing theorem.11
Thcxirem 4.7 l.c! J4 - 0 and definc 4- Z-} icos(3 t 120). !'he (umque)
subgame perfecl Nash eqvilibnum for (he location-then-pnce game is lhe location
parr (r„ zZ) -(- ~} j, Á- m) and for any location pair (zl, zz) the pnce pairs
{(~((ra-rl)(2txltz2)tAr), 3((rz-rl)(4-zr-zz)-Ar)),(á((rz-rl)(2t
rl } rz) t Artr),3((r2 - zl)(4 - zl - zz) - Arfl))}.
Proof This is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3.1, Propoeition 4.5 and
I.eRlrrla ~i.t).
When A- 0, mcaning that conaumers' preference for firm i in period t equals
consumers' preference Cor firm j in period t t 1, firm i can charge a higher price
in period t and firrn j can charge a higher price in period t } L In caae A1 ;~ 0,
both lirms will locate more close to the centre and price competition ia enlarged.
Profits for both firms aze (2 - y~) -F Isl~~~). One can check that profits are
maximal for A1 - Ar~l - 0. Oacillating preferencea of conaumers thus decrease
both lirrns' profits.
Lemrna 4.8 l,et A~ 0 6e given. F'orCk E[L t,Z, ] t~Z] there does not exis!
an equilibrium Jor tAe location stage.
Proof For Ck E[I } lZ , 1-} ~Z] it holds that xz(C) G xl(C), which contradicta
Assumption 1. Furthermore profits for both firrns are negative.
"Fhe proof of the following lemma is omitted. It followa from combining
equation (4.14) and cquation (4.15).
Lemma 4.9 l,el 1i ~ 0 be given. E'or Ck E[1 t já , 1 t~] the second order
conditions Jor a marimum are not satisfied, whereas these condilions are satiafied
for Ck E[1 f'i~ ~ 1 t iá]
Proposition 4.10 !'or Ck }I 1 lhere u a solution to the localion stage if and
only rJCk E[1 t i?~ 1~- ~].
Proof Sce Lcrnma 4.6, Lemma 4.8, and Lemma 4.9.
Lct C bc rr.presented as a linear combination of the two endpoints of the
interval [1 } 'iA, I}~], i.e., C- 1} 4- ~-1z~ where á E[0, 1] is the unique
value for which !~'~(C) - 0. Substitution in equation (4.22) yields
12}(9-á ).A - 6-3a' rl(C) - z4 z a-a. (4.23) ( ) 12}(4-a')A 6-3á
r2 C- 24 } 2 4-0' '
It is easy to sce that firms' locations are symmetric azound 1z}tz4~)~12
F'or A- 0 this meana that firma' locations are aymmetric azound z. After
some standard calculations we get xl --á } 4-~4 A} q~a~. and x'z -
5 (~A - ~a~
4 } 24 4 4-0' '
Note that Ck ~ 1 only holds for A~ 0. This enablee ua to formulate the
(ollowing theorem.
Theorem 4.11 Suppose A~ 0. Deftne ~q - ~Z and rY,~ - 4 4aa. .
The (unique~ .suógame perfect equiliórium for the location-then-pnce game is
!he locat(on pair (x„ x2) -(-y }~} rY,r, 4} 3- rY,r) and for any loeatian
pair(xr,zz) the price pairs {(s((x2-xt)(2}xt }xz)-}.Ar), 3((zz-xr)(4-xr -
xz)-Ar)),(á((rz-xr)(2}x~}xz)}Artr), 3((xz-xr)(d-2i-xz)-Artr))}.
Proof This follows from Propoaition 4.10 and equation (4.23).
When A~ 0 the consumera' preference for firm 1's product gives this firm
somc mnnopoly power, which enables it to gain higher profits. The other firm
gains lowcr pro(its. Firm 1's profits arc equal to (z -'lrY,t)(1 } y~A)2 } 3(1 }
?~A) } ;~;. -~ and (irm 'L's profits are equal to (2 - 2rY,r)(1 - y~a)2 -
j(1 - 9~A) } 18( ~2~Y,~)-
Now we have analyzed all the basic ingredients of the problem, we are able
to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.12 I'or all A satisfying Assumption E there exis(s a unique suó-
game perfect Nash equiliórinm for ihe location-then-pttice game
Proof F'or A- 0 wc have the apecial aituation that C- 1. The unique solution
for the location stage is given then by Proposition 4.5. For A 1 0 we have the
situation C E[1 } ~Z, 1} 12]. The solution for the location stage is given then
by equal.ion (4.`l2). 'I'he situation A G 0 holds by symmetry. In all aituationa
tho priec sta};, is solvcd hy prices according to Lcmma 3.1.
I'or A- 0 both lirrns adjuaL their location choicee 'symmetrically', i.e., one
firrn adds sorne (ixcd arnount to ita competitive location choice and the other firm
substracts thr. sarne amount (rorn its tompetitive. location choice. For A~ 0 the
location choiccs are adjusted asymmetrically. Firme do also take into account
thcir relativr. monopoly powcr. Consequently firma' profits in equilibrium are
the same for A- 0, whereas they di(fer for A~ 0.l3
5 Comparative statics: an example
In this acrtion wc look at an exarnple where Lhe fraction of young and old
consurners osrillates over two periods. '1'he fraction of young consumera in
period t equals the fraction of old conaumere in period t t 1, i.e., a~ - oot.
Automatically this means that the fraction of old conaumers in period t equals
the fractíon of young consumera in period t-~ 1. Recall that t and t } 1 are the
two periods of price competition. Eluthermore we asaume that a~ -az - á and
that ao - ao -- Z. This means that young conaumers have a higher valuation
for the product o( firm 1 and that old consumere have a higher valuation for the
product of firrn 2. If one thinks for example of two firms that aell bicyclea, then
firm ] would be the one that sella mountainbikes and firm 2 is the one that sells
traditional bikcs. By construction Ar --slrtt where Ae -(ai - ao)(a~ -
ar-a~,
a2 )- ' z'. We can apply Theorem 9.7 to calculate the aubgame perfect
Nash equilibrium outcome.
In Tablc 1 we have liated the valuea of flr, Artr, p, and ~ for different
values ofaY and ao and in Table 2 we have given the correaponding equilibrium
outcomes of rr, az Ptr, Putt, Pxa, and Pnft.
ar ar Ar .Ar~t lt ~
0.(10 L00 -0.50 0.50 0.9167 0.0285
0.`L5 0.75 -0.'l5 0.25 0.9792 0.0070
().5() ().5() ~.()n (].()[) 1.()~~n ~.~Q~~
0.75 0.25 0.25 -0.'l5 0.979'l 0.0070
I.00 0.00 0.50 -0.50 0.9167 0.0'l85
Table 1: Parameter valuea
or ar zt x2 Pta -Pzett Putt -Pza
0.00 1.00 -0.2405 1.2405 1.3143 1.6477
0.25 0.75 -0.2477 1.2477 1.4117 1.5788
O.fiO 0.50 -0.2500 1.2500 1.5000 1.5000
0.75 0.25 -0.2477 1.2477 1.5788 1.4117
1.00 0.00 -0.2405 1.2405 1.6477 1.3143
Table 2: Equilibrium locations and pricea
I~rom thes~~ (igurea we aee that firms' locations are closer the Icas eyual the
distribulion of consumer typea is. In case conaumer fractiona are conatant, the14
competitive outcome resultsz . In all other casea firms' prices differ. The firm
having the more (less) attractive variant for the majority of the consumers, can
set a higher (lower) price than in the competitive aituation.
ln 'Iable 3 wc have given the equilibrium valuee of i~ ,it~~,io, ior, Xrr,
X~r~r, Xz~ and Xzr~~. We aee that the demand a firm has in a certain period
ia higher Lhe greater the fraction of conaumera ior which its product ia more
attractive than the other firm's product is. Because the fraction of young and
old consurners oscillates, also firms' demand oacillatea.
ar zi xr ~ te tr ~ Xtc - Xzett Xrctr - Xze
0.00 0.7813 0.5563 0.4437 0.2187 0.4437 0.5563
0.25 0.7231 0.6113 0.3887 0.2767 0.4723 0.5277
0.50 0.6667 0.6667 0.3333 0.3333 0.5000 0.5000
0.75 O.6113 0.7231 0.2767 0.3887 0.5277 0.4723
1.00 0.5563 0.7813 0.2187 0.4437 0.5563 0.4437
Tahlc 3. Indi(ferent consumers and firrns' dernand in equilibrium
In Table 4 we have given the equilibrium values of IIrc, Qlrtr, Ilzc, Rzr~r,
IIrf, and Ilz~. As noted before profits are maximal in case consumer (ractions are
constant. 'I'he equilibrium locations are -q and 4 then. If conaumer fractione
arc not constant, per period profits difter over firma. The reason is that firm
1 has a product thaL is relatively more attractive to young consumere then the
product of firrn 2. '1'hc higher the íraction oC young conaumers, the greater firm
1's profit, and the higher Lhe fraction of old consumera, the greater firm 2's
profit. [3ecause the consumer fractions oacillate, one firm eazna higher profits in
the one period and the other firm earna higher profits in the other period.
rrc ac Ilcc - Ilzcti Il~c~~ - flac II~L - II,~
0.00 1 AO 0.5832 0.9166 1.499H
0.'l5 0.75 0.6667 0.8332 1.4999
O.:rO 0.50 0.7500 0.7500 1.5000
0.75 0.25 0.833`L 0.6667 1.4999
1.00 0.00 0.9166 0.5832 1.4998
Table 4: Equilibrium profits
'I'he situation becomes more interesting if we change ao - ao from -2 to -4.
Then A- 4 and we can apply Theorem 4.11 to calculate the subgame perfect
~ With ehe competitive outcome, we meen the autcome in the ~ituation without velualion
diNerencee.l5
Nash equilibriurn outcome. This is summariaed in '1'ables 5, 6 and 7. We aee
that firms' profits difter and furthermorc firm 1's profits are maximal in caae
consurner fractions are constant, whereas firm 2's profits are higher the greater
Lhc rliangc in r onvurncr fractions. Thc total aurplus that firrnv attract from the
consuntcrs is highcr than in thc competitive case.
at At Attt ~ a~ ~~ ~A
0.00 -0.2500 0.5000 0.3125 0.026446 0.124174 0.009992
0.25 -0.0625 0.3125 0.1016 0.006841 0.124786 0.001285
0.50 0.1250 0.1250 0.0313 0.000000 0.125000 0.000000
0.75 0.3125 -0.0625 0.1016 0.006841 0.124786 0.001285
1.00 0.5000 -0.2500 0.31'l5 0.026446 0.124174 0.004992
rr, xt zx Pte P2t Ptttt 1''t::'. -~
0.0(1 (1.20a(i L2864 1.4478 1.532'l 1.6978 1.'1H21
0.'l5 -(1.2071 1.2903 1.5181 1A767 1.6431 I.35 f 7
D.5(1 0.2083 L2917 1.5833 1A167 1.5833 1.41ti7
R75 -U.'1071 L`190:3 l.fi431 1.:3517 1.5181 1.47(i7
L00 -0.2036 1.2864 1.6978 1.5322 1.4478 I.Fi322
o, Xtt Xzt Xtttt Xzttt lltc llst.
0.00 0.4858 0.5142 0.5697 0.4303 1.6707 1.3395
0.25 0.5069 0.9931 0.5486 0.4513 1.6710 1.3383
0.50 0.5277 0.4722 0.5277 0.4722 1.6713 1.3380
0.75 0.5486 0.4513 0.5069 0.4931 1.fi710 1.3383
1.00 0.5697 0.9303 0.4856 0.5142 1.8707 1.3395Is
6 Conclusions
In this papcr wr examined the situation wherc two firma compete in pricea
for two periods and di(ír.rencea in consumer valuatione may occur. h'irma take
both rnultipcriod price competition and differences in conaumer valuations into
accounL in determining their optimal location. It ie clear that there will be a
trade-off betwc.en price and quantity.
Whenever the effect of the differencea in valuationa is the same in both
periods, i.e., Ar - Ar~,, both firms move in the same direction. Wherrt!ver
the elfect of the differences in valuations is the oppoaite in both periods, i.e.,
,qr --,4,~,, both firms move in the opposite direction.
Although we have not been able to give explicit analytical expresaions for
the firms' location choicea, it was possible to prove the exiatence of a unique
solution for the location-then-price game.
In case Ar --A,t, both firma earn the same profits and changing fractions
ol consumer types over time decrease both firms' profita. In case Ar ~-Artr,
one firm earns strictly higher profits.
An interesting topic for futurc research is to extend the model by allowing for
the possibility Lhat a firm does not necessarily attract both types ofconsumers in
both periods. "1'his basically meana that we should leavc the (strong) assumption
that consurnr,rs buy at any price.
l~urtherrnore one can weaken the as,9umption Lhat firma cannot influence the
valuations consurners have for their product.17
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